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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(2)(j) which states:
The supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including
jurisdiction
of
interlocutory
appeals, over: orders, judgments, and decrees
of any court of record over which the Court
of Appeals does not have original appellate
jurisdiction.
The District Court entered a summary judgment denying
Plaintiff Troy Darrington (hereinafter "Darrington") relief.

The

Honorable Richard Moffat held that Defendants Stanley L. Wade and
Janet

Wade

(hereinafter

"The

Wades") were

not

negligent

in

causing Darrington's injuries as a matter of law when the facts
were viewed in the light most favorable to Darrington.

The Court

also refused to reinstate a previous default decision which was
entered because the Wades refused to cooperate in discovery for
nearly four (4) years.

From this decision Darrington appeals.
ISSUES ON APPEAL

1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in

failing to reinstate

a default

judginent entered because the

respondent repeatedly failed to cooperate in discovery for nearly
four (4) years?
2.

Did the district court exceed its authority in

setting aside an entered default judgment pursuant to a Motion to
Reconsider?

2

3.

Do genuine issues of fact exist in this case which

prevent the district court from entering a summary judgment as a
matter of law?
STATUTE AND RULES
1.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 55(c):

For good cause shown the court may set aside
an entry of default and, if a judgment by
default has been entered, may likewise set it
aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
2.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59:

(a) Grounds.
Subject to the provision of
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or
any of the parties and on all or part of the
issues, for any of the following causes;
provided, however, that on a motion of a new
trial in an action tried without a jury, the
Court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law or
make new findings and conclusions, and direct
the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings
of the Court, jury or adverse
party, or any Order of the Court,
or abuse of discretion by which
either party was prevented from
having a fair trial
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and
whenever any on e or more of the
jurors have been induced to assent
to any general or special verdict,
or to a finding on any question
submitted to them by the Court, by
resort to a determination by chance
or as a result of bribery, such
misconduct may be proved by the
Affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which
ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against.
(4) Newly
discovered
evidence,
material for the party making the
3

application, which he could not,
with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the
trial
(5) Excessive
or
inadequate
damages, appearing to have been
given under
the
influence
of
passion or prejudice
(6) insUffic:[enCy 0 f the evidence to
justify the verdict or other decision,
or that I t i s against law.
( 7) Error i n J aw.
(b) Time for Motion.
A motion fc* -- ctrial shall be served not later than iw days
after the entry of the judgment,,
(c) Affidavits; time for fi ling. When the
application for a new trial is made under
Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it
shall be supported by affidavit, Whenever a
motion for a new trial is based upon
affidavits they shall be served with the
motion. The opposing party has 10 days after
such service withi n which to serve opposing
affidavits.
The time within which the
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall e
served may be extended for an additional
period not exceeding 20 days either by the
court for good cause shown or by the parties
by written stipulation
The court may permit
reply affidavits.
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than
10 days after entry of a judgment the court
of its own initiative may order a new trial
for any reason for which i t might have
granted a new trial on motion of a party, and
in the order shall specify the grounds
therefor,
(e) Motion to a] ter or amend a judgment.
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall
served not later than 10 days after entry of
judgment.
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3.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c):

The motion shall be served at least ten (10)
days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability
alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In this case Appellant
"Darrington")

seeks

$32,392.90

Troy Darrington
for

injuries

(hereinafter

incurred

at

a

skateboard park which was leased by the Respondents Stanley L.
Wade and Janet Wade (hereinafter "the Wades").

The Wades have

breached their standard of care toward Darrington and are liable
for the principal amount of $32,392.90.

Accordingly, the Summary

Judgment entered by the District Court must be reversed and their
previous Default Judgment reinstated.
The disposition of the lower court was entered by the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat on or about May 25, 1989.

Judge

Moffat held that the Wades were not negligent toward Darrington
and did not cause his injuries and therefore they were entitled
to summary judgment.

Upon the same reasoning, the Court refused

to reinstate the previous default judgment entered against the
Wades which was due to their refusals to cooperate in discovery
for nearly four (4) years.
5

The

Respondents,

Stanley

Wade

and

Janet

Wade, own

certain property on which a skateboard park was built.

The

Defendants entered into an agreement with a prior tenant to have
the skateboard park built on their property.

In describing this

tenancy in a deposition, Mr. Wade testified:

"The basic premise

of the lease was that he was to build and construct a skateboard
park."

(Deposition of Stanley Wade, 18 March, 1988, on file with

the Court, page 23, line 22-23; hereinafter referred to as "Wade
Depo".)

The property owned by the Wades with the skateboard park

was released by them as a skateboard park business approximately
three (3) or four (4) different times.

On May 20, 1983 the Wades

leased the premises, to Bob Iverson who was also a Defendant in
this case.

(Wade depo, Exhibit 3.)

It was contemplated by both

parties that members of the general public would be invited onto
the premises

to

skateboard.

The Wades were concerned

over

liability and wanted liability insurance to be carried by Bob
Iverson so that injuries would be covered.

(Wade depo, p.31.)

Although the Wades, on several occasions, asked about insurance
coverage from Iverson, he never obtained insurance or provided
proof of obtaining insurance to the Wades, in violation of the
lease between them.

(Wade depo, p. 35-36.)

At the time the premises were leased by the Wades there
was a missing drain cover in the bottom of one of the skateboard
park runs, which was a dangerous condition for those using the
park.

Approximately fifteen (15) days after the lease of the

skateboard park from the Wades to Iverson, the Appellant Troy
6

Darrington was injured on the premises.
Interrogatories, on file.)

(Darrington Answers to

Darrington visited the park and knew

there was one well known run with a missing cover.
always had the cover missing.

The same run

On the day of the accident,

however, the cover had been removed from the skateboard run that
had originally had a drain cover, and was placed in a skateboard
run that did not originally have a drain cover.

Darrington's

skateboard was caught in the uncovered drain while he was in
motion and Darrington sustained serious injuries.

(Affidavit of

Darrington on file.)
Since
Darrington's

this

filing,

case
the

commenced
Wades

on

have

June

5,

continually

1983

at

delayed,

hindered, and obstructed the progression of this case, and have
failed to timely respond to the discovery efforts of Darrington.
Because of the elusive efforts of the Wades, Darrington had to
resort to service by publication, which commenced in January of
1984 and ended one month later.

The Wades filed their Answer in

March of 1984 and had delayed the case nine (9) months.

(See

Answers on file.)
After receiving the Wades1 Answer, Darrington promptly
sent Interrogatories to the Wades in March of 1984.
Customarily,

the

Wades

failed

to

file

a

(See file.)

timely

answer.

Darrington had to file his first of several motions to compel
answers in April of 1984.

(See Court file.)

Nearly a month

after filing the motion to compel, but prior to a hearing, the
Wades filed answers.
7

The Wades delayed this case further by changing counsel
three different times.

The Wades1

first attorney, Mr. Frank

Smith, made a fruitless effort for several months to settle the
case.

These efforts only delayed the prosecution of Darrington's

case.

When settlement proved impossible, Darrington certified

his case as ready for trial on November 8, 1984.

At the time of

Darrington's certification of readiness, Darrington's counsel had
been

waiting

settlement.

sixty

(60)

days

for

the

Wades'

response

for

(See, case file below and Plaintiff's Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Vacate Judgment at page 2)
The Wades objected to Darrington's Certification of Readiness. A
Pre-trial Conference was set for March of 1985.

The Wades'

second attorney, then not of record, Mr. Roger Sandack, appeared.
Mr. Sandack had discovery reopened.

For another nine (9) months

Darrington tried to resolve the case.
In November of 1985 the Wades sent their first set of
Interrogatories, which were timely answered by Darrington.

For a

second time, Darrington certified his case as ready for trial,
but again the Wades objected in June of 1986.

The case was set

for a Pre-trial Conference to commence in April of 1986.
record below.)

(See

The Wades' second attorney claimed more discovery

was needed, even though he had done nothing for six (6) months
since becoming the Wades' counsel of record, except for sending
Darrington interrogatories which were answered by Darrington four
(4) months before this conference.

Nevertheless, the Court

failed to schedule the case for trial and opened up discovery
8

through June of 1986.
further discovery

However, the Wades did not conduct any

even though they claimed

it was necessary

before trial could be set.
Darrington sent another set of interrogatories to the
Wades but they again failed to answer.

Darrington filed a Motion

to Compel in August of 1986 with a Notice of Hearing.

At the

hearing Honorable Judge Dean Condor (the first Judge in the case)
entered an order compelling answers within ten (10) days, the
violation of which would result in dismissal of Wades1 pleadings.
Darrington mailed the proposed Order to the Court and to the
Wades'

counsel.

nothing.

The Wades

did

not timely

object, but did

A default judgment was sent to the Wades' counsel and

the Court in October of 1986.

No timely objection challenged the

Order

setting

pleadings

After

the

aside Wade's

judgment,

counsel.

the

and

Wades' second

entering

attorney

judgment.

withdrew

as

The Wades' third set of attorneys objected to the

default judgment.

Despite the Wades' persistent delays for over

three (3) years a new Judge assigned to the case (Judge Moffat)
set aside the default judgment.
Once again Darrington sought to prosecute his case.
Depositions

of Stanley Wade were scheduled

and attempted

on

February 1, 1988, March 18, 1988, July 19, 1988, October 5, 1988
and March 30, 1989, and on each of these occasions except for the
last, Stanley Wade either refused to appear or else appeared
without having complied with Requests for Production of Documents
to enable the deposition to be taken.
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Finally, the Court ordered

that the deposition of Wade be taken on or about May 27, 1988,
and notwithstanding
appear.

the Court's order, Wade

failed again to

As a result of Wade's failure to appear, the Court

entered another Default Judgment against the Wades on or about
November 14, 1988.

The Court stated:

The Defendant, Stanley L. Wade, has not
performed in accordance with the prior Order
of the Court compelling discovery, and has
repeatedly
failed
to
perform
his
responsibilities under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(See November 4, 1988 Order at page 2.)

Seven months later, on

or about May 25, 1989 the Court, after setting aside this second
judgment, entered a summary judgment for the Wades and refused to
re-enter the previous judgment.

The Wades were successful in

delaying Darrington's case for almost six (6) years.

Darrington,

as

legal

costs

and

the

Wades

have

a

result,

difficulties

in

has

incurred

preparing

unnecessary

his

case

because

successfully inhibited, a prompt discovery.

Darrington's case

represents the longest and most time consuming case ever handled
by the firm Maddox, Nelson & Snuffer.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court failed to follow the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure in setting aside the default judgment in this
case.

Nearly ninety

(90) days after entering a judgment the

district court erroneously set it aside pursuant to an objection
to a proposed order and Motion to Reconsider.

This contravenes

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which specifically require a
motion to set aside an already entered judgment.
10

Never in this

case did the Wades enter such a motion and their objection to the
proposed order failed to satisfy the rules.
Court

set

aside

its judgment.

To

allow

Nevertheless, the
such

an abuse of

discretion would continue to delay this case further and deny
Darrington due process.
The district court has abused its discretion in failing
to reinstate Darrington's judgment against the Wades.
four (4) years the Wades have delayed this case.
continually

For over

The Wades have

refused to answer interrogatories and admissions,

have refused to cooperate in depositions at least four (4) times,
have

changed

counsel

three

(3) times

and

have

objected

to

Darrington's readiness for trial at least twice and have obtained
an erroneous summary judgment nearly five (5) years after the
commencement of Darrington's suit.

Darrington has not received

the benefits of a prompt discovery and has not received a just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of his claim.

The district

court has a duty to use its discretion in order to resolve claims
as inexpensively as possible.

The district court has entered two

(2) judgments because of the delays in this case caused by the
Wades behavior.

However, they have on both occasions set aside

those judgments and in so doing have abused their discretion.
The district court cannot enter a summary judgment on
the Wades behalf because genuine issues of fact prevent the court
from ruling as a matter of law.

The essential elements of a

negligence action, such as this, create genuine issues of fact.
These questions cannot be answered as a matter of law but require
11

a jury determination.

For instance, did the Wades have a duty of

reasonable care to prevent Darrington's injury?
that duty of care?

Did they breach

And finally, did they know of the dangerous

condition which caused Darrington's injury prior to their leasing
the skateboard park?

These questions are material to answering

the question of whether the Wades are liable in this case for
Darrington's injuries.

They in effect prevent the district court

from ruling as a matter of law and granting the Wades summary
judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court has abused its discretion in
refusing to reinstate its judgment against the Wades.
A.
Darrington is entitled to a judgment against the
Wades because they have refused to cooperate in
discovery.
The

district

court

has

abused

its

discretion

by

entering a summary judgment against Darrington, whose right to a
prompt

discovery

and

a

"just,

speedy

and

inexpensive

determination" of his action has been violated by this court.
(Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1.)

The Utah Supreme Court

is clearly opposed to tactical delays in discovery as were used
by the Wades in this case.

The Wades's conduct in this case

warrants a reversal of the district court's summary judgment in
their

behalf

and

a reinstatement

of the judgment which was

entered against the Wades due to their refusal to cooperate in
discovery for approximately five (5) years.
In 1977, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that:
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the sanction of default judgment is justified
where there has been a frustration of the
judicial process, viz,, where the failure to
respond to discovery impedes trial on the
merits and makes it impossible to ascertain
whether the allegations . . . have any
factual merit.
W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Parkwest Village, Inc., 568 P.2d
734, 738

(Utah 1977).

In that case the defendant refused to

cooperate with the plaintiff who requested interrogatories and
admissions to complete discovery.
plaintiffs

served

the

Nearly one (1) year after the

defendant

with

the

first

set

of

interrogatories, the district court entered a default judgment as
a sanction pursuant to Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

In upholding that Default decision, the Utah Supreme

Court reasoned:
A party to an action has a right to have the
benefits of discovery procedure promptly, not
only in order that he may have ample time to
prepare his case, but also in order to bring
to light facts which may entitled him to
summary judgment or induce settlement prior
to trial. The rules were designed to secure
"the
just,
speedy
and
inexpensive
determination of every action," Rule 1. (Id.
at 738)
As

in Parkwest Village, the Wades have refused to

cooperate in discovery.
to

answer

However, not only have the Wades refused

interrogatories

and

answer

admissions,

they

have

refused to cooperate in depositions at least four (4) times, they
have

changed

counsel

three

(3) times, and have objected to

Darrington's readiness for trial at least twice.

The Wades have

exceeded the one (1) year delay of the defendant in Parkwest
Village by at least three and a half (3 1/2) years.

Darrington,

because of the Wades1 conduct, has not received the benefits of a
prompt discovery which would enable him to acquire the best
available evidence and facts that would support a judgment in his
behalf.

In short, he has not received the just, speedy and

inexpensive determination of his action as the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure contemplate.

The district court has abused its

discretion in setting aside a judgment approximately ninety (90)
days after the judgment had been entered.
B.
The district court abused its discretion in
setting aside an entered default decision pursuant to
an objection to a proposed order.
The district court failed to follow the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure in setting aside Darrington's judgment against
the Wades.

Rule 59 requires a motion to be made within 10 days.

There was no motion for a new trial or to amend judgment ever
filed.

The only motion asked for reconsideration.

This Court

has held that such a Motion does not stay the time for appeal.
The Wades did not appeal timely.

Nonetheless, the lower court

altered the judgment without any procedural justification.
As to the setting aside of the judgment, the Court
lacked authority to do so.

The time for filing an appeal with

the Utah Supreme Court had expired at the time the Defendant
pursued its Motion.

The Defendant had the obligation to either:

1) within 10 days file a motion to alter or amend judgment or
motion for a new trial, or 2)

within one month file an appeal,.

Albretson v. Judd. 709 P.2d 347 (Utah 1985)

The Defendant's

actions are merely an effort to breathe new life into a case that
14

has already become settled, final, and unappealable.

This Court

should reverse the lower Court and reinstate the judgment nunc
pro tunc to November 14, 1988.

The Defendant Wade exercised

gross disregard for the Rules of Procedure and was flagrant in
his lack of cooperation in the discovery process.
In this case the Wades' motion was an objection to a
proposed order.

The order had in actuality already been entered.

The court set aside its judgment even though the appropriate
motion had not been filed.
The Wades have never filed a motion to set aside the
default judgment already entered according to Rule 60(b)(1).
District

court

erroneously

pursuant

to an objection

set

aside

its

default

The

judgment

to a proposed order and motion to

reconsider and has effectively rewritten the Rules.

Viewing this

in conjunction with the Wades' tactical delays in this case the
district court has abused is discretion and the Utah Supreme
Court has a duty to reinstate the previous judgment.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

is completely

justified

in

overruling the district court's summary judgment and reinstating
the judgment

entered against the Wades as a result of their

refusing to cooperate in discovery.

Darrington has suffered by

incurring unnecessary legal costs and in being unable to prepare
an effective case.

A default judgment is justified by the Wades'

"persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process."
Parkwest, supra.
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II.
The district court cannot grant the Wades
judgment because genuine issues of fact exist.
The

district

court

incorrectly

granted

summary

the

Wade's

motion for summary judgment according to Rule 56(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

This Rule states in pertinent part:

Judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Genuine issues of fact prevent the district court from
granting the Wades' summary judgment as a matter of law.

Because

there exists genuine issues of fact in this case, the district
court's summary judgment should be reversed.

Even if this Court

elects not to reinstate the judgment against Wade, Darrington is
entitled to a decision on the merits.

Viewing the facts most

favorably to Darrington there is enough to justify a finding in
his behalf.
The essential elements of a negligence action create
genuine

issues

of

fact

in

this

case.

The

elements

of a

negligence action include "(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by
the defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) the
causation, both actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the
suffering of damages by the plaintiff."

Williams v. Melbv, 699

P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985).
To
reasonable

determine

care

to

whether

Darrington
16

the
a

Wades

number

of

owed

a

duty

of

factors must be

considered.
conduct;

(1) the moral blame attached to the Defendants'
(2) the policy of preventing future harm;

(3) the

extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach;

(4) availability, cost and prevalence of

insurance for the risk involved;
the Plaintiff;
injury

and

defendants

(5) foreseeability of harm to

(6) degree of certainty that plaintiff suffered

(7) the closeness
conduct

and

the

of the connection between the

injuries

suffered.

Rowland

v.

Christian. 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
The

Wades

are morally

incurred by Darrington.
inherently dangerous.

blame-worthy

for the

injury

By their nature, skateboard parks are
Those who lease such businesses must be

held to a higher standard of care because there is a great risk
of injury involved with skateboard parks.

Landlords who rent

such facilities to tenants have a responsibility to insure that
the

premises

injuries.

are

free

from

known

dangers

that

could

cause

This responsibility prevents future harm to patrons

using such facilities.

The Wades1 burden in purchasing a new

drain cover before renting the facilities to Iverson can hardly
be compared to the $32,392.90 incurred by Darrington as a result
of his injuries.

Moreover, the Wades could have easily purchased

insurance for themselves or required their tenants to be insured
for the risks involved with the skateboard park.

The injury that

Darrington suffered was foreseeable as in Williams, supra.

The

Utah Supreme Court recognized that landlords have a duty to make
17

conditions reasonably

safe, especially when the premises are

leased for purposes of admitting the public and a member of the
public is injured.
other

(Williams, supra at 726-27.)

considerations

Darrington's

foreseen by the Wades.

injury

In light of the

should

have

been

In fact, the Wades were concerned about

their potential liability for injuries, and they attempted to
require

their

however,

the

tenants
Wades

liability insurance.

to

failed

obtain
to

insurance.

require

their

In this case,
tenant

to have

It is also certain that Darrington suffered

injuries as a result of his skateboard accident.

The Wades' duty

in this case as well as the immense risk of injuries involved
with skateboard parks warrants a close connection to Darrington's
injury.

A genuine issue of fact exists as to whether the Wades

had a duty of reasonable care toward Darrington.

It is also

clear, as to causation, that the injury could not have occurred
but for the Wade's leasing of the premises without the drain
cover.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the question of
breach of a defendant's duty to a plaintiff is a question of fact
for the jury. (Williams, supra.)

Genuine issues of fact are

raised in this case concerning the Wades' breach of their duty to
Darrington.

Did the Wades know or should they have known of the

defects in the skateboard ramp prior to the lease?
Wades have learned of the defective condition?

Could the

Because these

questions exist in this case, the district court cannot rule as a
matter of law in granting the Wades summary judgment.
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These

questions are genuine issues of fact that must be determined only
by a jury.
Oregon has proposed a test for determining landlord's
liability

to

other

persons

besides

tenants

property.

The Oregon Supreme court stated:

on their

leased

"The nature of the defect might be such that
the landlord would reasonably expect that the
tenant would take steps to remedy the defect
or otherwise to safeguard persons entering
them at his invitation."
Bellikka v. Green, 762 P.2d 997, 1008 (Or. 1988).

In developing

this standard the Oregon Supreme Court held that a landlord
should not escape liability for reasonable, foreseeable harms.
Id. at 1007.

The Court also outlined a number of factors to

determine whether a landlord would reasonably expect a tenant to
remedy defects.
conditions if:

A tenant is not expected to remedy dangerous
he has a short term lease, he has already agreed

to repair, there is an undisclosed dangerous condition known only
by the landlord, or the landlord has retained control of a part
of the lease.

Id.

In applying the Oregon standard there exists genuine
issues of fact as to whether the Wades should have expected their
tenant to remedy the defect that created the risk of harm to
Darrington.

In this case the tenant was under a short term lease

for one year.
is unclear

The defect existed at the time of the lease.

It

from the evidence whether the tenant knew of the

dangerous condition or whether the Wades were the only ones who
knew of the dangerous condition.
19

CONCLUSION
The district court's summary judgment on behalf of the
Wades should be reversed and the prior judgment reinstated in
Darringtonfs behalf.

The district court cannot rule as a matter

of law against Darrington in this case because there are genuine
issues of fact.

The Wades have successfully delayed this case

for five (5) years, and Darrington has not received the benefits
of prompt discovery and as a result has received irreparable harm
at the hands of the district court.

Finally, the district court

failed to follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in setting
aside its default judgment.

The Utah Supreme Court must correct

this abuse of discretion exhibited by the district court by
reinstating Darrington1s judgment.
DATED this 3 > ^

day of August,J^S^C n

Snuff!
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